Barro argues that the government should
guarantee property rights. These property rights are essential to securing
stable income, drawing productive investments, and providing incentives to
pursue long-term policies. By protecting property rights, governments can help
to make their countries friendlier to growth. Yet, it might be that the people
don’t need the government to codify property rights but rather the government needs
codified property rights to govern the people.
The solidification of property rights by
the state requires the legibility of such rules. States require solid property
rights in order to achieve taxation schemes; a government needs to know how
much people have in order to take it away from them. In James C. Scott’s 1998
book, Seeing Like A State, he
explains that in traditional societies property rights and regulations were
determined at the village level. Thus, there could be serious discrepancies
between villages in the type of system used. While to the people living in each
village this system would be completely comprehensible, it would be a nightmare
for state officials. It is much easier to measure property and thereby taxation
when the property is divided into grid-like land, owned by only one owner, who
harvests only one crop. For example, in Norway, the land of large farms, called
“Gards” were owned communally, yet families had property rights to portions of
the yield. These villagers also shared commons resources such as forests,
fisheries, and resin collection. Although there was no convincing evidence that
this common property system was less productive, the state forced the
solidification of property rights. Thus, it seems that the idea of a modern
state necessitates a comprehensible property system. The role of government in
the traditional conception of property rights is not necessarily based in
concern over the wellbeing of the people.
Furthermore, while people with property
rights clearly benefit from strong property rights systems, there is an equity
concern. The process of guaranteeing property rights may leave some out. In the
solidification of property rights, the complexities of older systems of
ownership may be overlooked, making some worse off.
For example, in the mid-twentieth
century, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the corresponding rise of the
nation-state in the Persian Gulf led to the creation of new borders. These
states delineated their borders, identified their population, and codified
property rights. However, for thousands of years, nomadic tribes had maintained
rights to access to lands and water sources. When property rights were laid
down, according to state-centric conceptions of ownership that are biased
towards sedentary groups (because they are more comprehensible), nomadic tribes
were left out. Many of these people were not even given the right to a
nationality. These people, known as the bedoon,
meaning “without” in Arabic, are a significant minority. In Kuwait alone, which
has a population of 1.3 million people, between 80,000 and 140,000 people are
without citizenship, according to Refugees International. These people,
deprived of their property rights by a state trying to solidify property
rights, cannot easily get marriage licenses, birth or death certificates. Thus,
they cannot legally get married, own property, or find employment within the
formal sector. Many bidun support themselves through underground economic
activity such as peddling goods on the street, hawking DVDS, and in some cases
even selling blood and organs. The bidun are barred from registering a vehicle,
telephone line, or buy a SIM card.
While property rights do have benefits
and are critical to a developing society, governments wishing to implement them
more strongly should make sure that they are doing it for the right reason and
not oversimplifying the existing system of property rights.
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