Legitimizing Coups? - A look at Latin American military regimes

Barro makes a controversial statement regarding the Peruvian coup with his strong refutation of Baker’s statement (Baker was the current US Secretary of State), “You cannot destroy democracy in order to save it” (38). In essence, Barro states that sometimes the best way to promote democracy is to suspend it. Indeed, he argues that certain dire circumstances necessitate such an action and will help make the democracy more robust later. Thus, he defends the Mr. Fujimori’s coup because “the economic and political situation was sufficiently desperate that President Fujimori’s iron hand represented the only hope for improvement” (38). Contextualizing Mr. Fujimori’s coup with the then shocking strength of Peruvian terrorists helps support this statement. Perhaps the Peruvian state was so dysfunctional that it was time to scrap democracy in order to deal with security threats before reinstating democracy. 

While reading this example of a ‘good’ example of suspending democracy, I couldn’t help but think that Barro neglected much of Latin American history while making his case. In the late half of the 20th century, political instability characterized most Central and South American countries, leading to endless coups and military regimes. The high political volatility created by these seizures of power crippled many Latin American economies. Guatemala, for example, has an extremely turbulent political history. Starting in 1960 and stretching all the way till 1996, a civil war raged between the labor Left and the right winged military. Figure one depicts this political climate’s impact on GDP growth. Notice, especially, that in the early 80s where civil rights were most violated under the dictatorship of notorious Rios Mont, GDP growth fell considerably.

Guatemala’s history is an extreme example, but collectively such cases show that coups have the potential to lead to weakened faith in government institutions and thus can seriously threaten economic infrastructure.  

However, Barro rightly points out that coups can sometimes be effective in reducing violence and restoring order. Columbia’s 1957 coup reflects this benefit. In this situation, the Army Chief of Staff General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was overthrown by a coup supported by conservatives and liberals alike. This change in government helped facilitate the countries gradual shift towards democracy. 

Perhaps Barro was correct in disagreeing with Baker’s strong statement “You cannot destroy democracy in order to save it.”  However, the short-term nature of solutions produced by coups coupled with their potential to shatter a government’s legitimacy makes them very vulnerable to negative societal, political, and economic repercussions.  

SOURCES

1. http://www.world66.com/southamerica/colombia/history

2. http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/LACEA-LAMES/2008/42/Fiscal_sustainability_and_economic_growth_in_Bolivia_FV.pdf